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Abstract—Smart Contracts and transactions allow users to
implement elaborate constructions on cryptocurrency blockchains
like Bitcoin, Ethereum, and Libra. Many of these, including
operational payment channels, use a building block called Hashed
Time-Locked Contract (HTLC ).
In this work, we distill from HTLC a specification (HTLC-
Spec), and present an implementation called Mutual-Assured-
Destruction Hashed Time-Locked Contract (MAD-HTLC ). MAD-
HTLC employs a novel approach of utilizing the existing block-
chain operators, called miners, as part of the design. If a user
misbehaves, MAD-HTLC incentivizes the miners to confiscate all
her funds. We prove that MAD-HTLC satisfies HTLC-Spec with
game-theoretic analysis and instantiate it on Bitcoin’s operational
blockchain.
Notably, current miner software makes only little effort to
optimize revenue, since the advantage is relatively small. How-
ever, as the demand grows and other revenue components shrink,
miners are more motivated to fully optimize their fund intake.
By patching the standard Bitcoin client, we demonstrate such an
optimization is easy to implement, making the miners natural
enforcers of MAD-HTLC .
Finally, we show how vulnerable HTLC is to bribery attacks.
An attacker can incentivize miners to prefer her transactions
by offering high transaction fees. We demonstrate this can be
easily implemented by patching the Bitcoin client, and use game-
theoretic tools to qualitatively tighten the known cost bound of
such bribery attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Blockchain-based cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin [1] and
Ethereum [2] are monetary systems with a market cap
of $270B [3]. They enable simple transactions of internal
tokens and implementation of more elaborate smart contracts.
The transactions create the smart contracts and interact with
them. Entities called miners create data structures called blocks
that contain transactions. They publish and order the blocks to
form a blockchain, thus confirming the included transactions
and achieving system progress. The system state is obtained
by parsing the transactions according to the block order.
Blockchain security relies on incentives, rewarding miners
with tokens for carrying out their tasks.
A prominent smart-contract design pattern is the Hashed
Time-Locked Contract (HTLC ), set up for two participants,
Alice and Bob. It asserts that Alice gets tokens for presenting
a hash preimage of a specific value before a certain timeout,
otherwise Bob gets them. A variety of more elaborate smart-
contract designs rely on HTLC as a building block (§II). These
include high-frequency payment channels [4], [5], [6], [7], [8],
[9], [10], atomic swaps [11], [12], [13], [14], [15], contingent
payments [16], [17], [18], [19], [20], and cryptocurrency
vaults [21], [22], [23], [24]. We identify the specification
required by the variety of contracts using HTLC and call
it HTLC-Spec .
Unfortunately, HTLC is vulnerable to bribery attacks [25],
[26], [27]. Winzer et al. [28] showed that Bob can bribe miners
to ignore Alice’s transactions until the timeout elapses. This
allows Bob to obtain the HTLC tokens while depriving Alice
of them, even if Alice published the preimage.
In this work we provide a secure implementation for HTLC-
Spec , and further analyze HTLC susceptibility.
We begin by describing the model for an underlying
blockchain mechanism like that of Libra [29], Ethereum
or Bitcoin (§III). The system’s state is a set of contracts;
each contract comprises a token amount and a predicate;
transactions redeem contract tokens by providing inputs that
satisfy their predicates. Users publish transactions initiating
new contracts, assigning them with the redeemed tokens while
also offering some as fees. In each round one miner adds a
block with a transaction to the chain and receives its fee.
We proceed to present MAD-HTLC , our HTLC-Spec im-
plementation (§IV). MAD-HTLC relies on the novel idea that
miners are also participants in a smart contract execution, and
thus their interests should be taken into account. MAD-HTLC
utilizes miners as enforcers of its correct execution, allowing
and incentivizing them to seize its contract tokens in case of
any bribery attempt. That, in turn, incentivizes Alice and Bob
to refrain from such attempts and to interact with MAD-HTLC
as intended.
In addition to the preimage specified by HTLC-Spec , which
we denote preimga, MAD-HTLC uses a second preimage,
preimgb, known only to Bob. MAD-HTLC comprises a
main deposit contract (MH-Dep) and an auxiliary collateral
contract (MH-Col ), which work as follows. MH-Dep has three
so-called redeem paths. First, it allows Alice to redeem it
with a transaction including the predefined preimage, preimga.
Alternatively, it allows Bob to redeem it after a timeout with a
transaction including another preimage, preimgb. This is essen-
tially the specification, but MH-Col provides another option,
allowing any miner to redeem it herself with a transaction
including both preimga and preimgb.
Now, if both Alice and Bob try to redeem MH-Dep , then
their transactions must reveal preimages preimga and preimgb,
respectively. Any miner can then simply take these preimages
and issue her own transaction that uses the third redeem path
to seize the tokens for herself. Specifically, if Alice tries to
redeem MH-Dep , then Bob is assured that he cannot do so –
ar
X
iv
:2
00
6.
12
03
1v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  2
2 J
un
 20
20
if he tried to redeem the tokens then the miners would get them
instead. Assuming Bob is benign, i.e., rational but prefers to
act honestly for the same reward, then this construction is
sufficient to satisfy HTLC-Spec . But we can do better.
If Bob is spiteful, then he will prefer to reduce Alice’s
reward if it doesn’t affect his. When Alice knows preimga
and tries to redeem MH-Dep , Bob cannot redeem it as well,
but he can publish a redeem transaction nonetheless allowing
the miners to collect the tokens instead of Alice.
We strengthen MAD-HTLC such that Bob is strictly in-
centivized to refrain from such deviant behavior with the
auxiliary contract MH-Col . It can be redeemed only after the
same timeout as MH-Dep , either by a transaction of Bob, or
by any miner that provides both preimga and preimgb. Now, if
Alice knows preimga then she can redeem MH-Dep and Bob
can redeem MH-Col . If instead Bob contends with Alice for
MH-Dep , both still lose the MH-Dep for the miners; but now
both preimga and preimgb are revealed, allowing miners to
seize the MH-Col tokens as well. Bob is therefore strictly
incentivized not to contend, allowing Alice to receive the
tokens as required.
MAD-HTLC utilizes the mutual assured destruction [30]
principle: If a party misbehaves then all parties lose everything.
Although penalizing the well-behaved party as well, this
mechanism design [31] technique ensures rational players act
as intended.
We prove that MAD-HTLC satisfies HTLC-Spec by show-
ing its desired behavior is the best response of the various
players (§V). We formalize its execution as a game played
by Alice, Bob and the miners, all seeking to maximize their
revenue and minimize their expenses. We analyze the game
and show that the prescribed behavior is incentive-compatible.
MAD-HTLC can be trivially implemented in rich smart-
contract languages like Libra’s Move [32] and Ethereum’s
Solidity [33]. We prove the efficacy of MAD-HTLC by
implementing it in the less expressive Bitcoin Script [34]
smart-contract language (§VI). We deploy it on Bitcoin’s main
network, and show it bears negligible overhead compared to
the prevalent HTLC .
MAD-HTLC relies on miners’ rationality. However, as of
today, default cryptocurrency clients only offer basic optimiz-
ation. Changes in miners’ revenue structure will make better
optimizations more important (§II-B). To demonstrate miners
can easily enhance transaction choice optimization once they
choose to do so, we patch the standard Bitcoin client [35] to
allow for easy additions of elaborate logic. In particular, we
implement the logic enabling miners to benefit from enforcing
the correct execution of MAD-HTLC .
We conclude by revisiting the security of the prevalent
HTLC implementation and refine previous results [28] regard-
ing its vulnerability to bribing attacks (§VII).
We show that HTLC is vulnerable even in blockchains with
limited Script-like languages. We analyze the miners’ behavior
as a game. Each suffix of the game can be analyzed as a
subgame, and all players have perfect knowledge of the system
state. Bob can take advantage of this setting to incentivize
miners to withhold Alice’s transaction until the timeout. He
makes withholding the single subgame perfect equilibrium in
the game. This proves that in the presence of rational miners
the attack-cost lower bound of Winzer et al. [28] is tight. Here
miners only have to be non-myopic for the attack to succeed,
a simple optimization we implement by patching the standard
Bitcoin client with merely 150 lines of code.
In summary, we make the following contributions:
• We formalize the specification HTLC-Spec of the preval-
ent HTLC contract,
• present MAD-HTLC that satisfies HTLC-Spec utilizing
rational miners as participants,
• implement MAD-HTLC , deploy it, and evaluate its over-
head,
• prove MAD-HTLC is incentive compatible,
• prove HTLC is vulnerable to bribery attacks in limited
smart-contract environments, and
• qualitatively tighten the bound of Winzer et al. [28] and
implement the required rational miner behavior.
Open Source and Responsible Disclosure: We intend
to complete a responsible-disclosure process with prominent
blockchain development groups before making this public. We
intend to open source our code, subject to security concerns
of the community.
II. RELATED WORK
We are not aware of previous work that utilized miners’
natural incentives to use them as participants in smart contract
design.
We review previous work on bribing attacks in block-
chains (§II-A), then detail exhibited and postulated mining be-
havior with respect to transaction selection (§II-B), and present
systems and applications reliant on HTLC-Spec (§II-C).
A. Bribery Attacks.
Winzer et al. [28] present attacks that delay confirmation of
specific transactions until a given timeout elapses. Specifically,
one of their attacks applies to HTLC where Bob delays the
confirmation of Alice’s redeeming transaction until he can
redeem it himself. Their presented attack requires a predicates
available only with a richer smart contract languages like
Ethereum’s Solidity [33] and Libra’s Move [32] but not Bit-
coin’s Script [34]. In contrast, our attack works with Bitcoin’s
Script well, as we demonstrate by implementation. It therefore
applies a wider range of systems [36], [37], [38].
They present two results regarding the attack costs. First,
they show that Bob’s attack cost for making miner’s col-
laboration with the attack a Nash-equilibrium grows linearly
with the size of the smallest miner. However, all miners
not cooperating with the attack is also a Nash equilibrium.
Therefore, they analyze Bob’s cost for making the attack a
dominant strategy, i.e., each miner is incentivized to cooperate
irrespective of the other miners’ strategies. This bound grows
linearly with relative miner sizes, and exponentially with the
HTLC timeout.
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Our analysis improves this latter bound by taking into
account the miners all know the system state and each others’
incentives. This insight allows us to use the subgame perfect
equilibrium [39], [40], [41], [42], [43], [44], [45], [46] solution
concept, a refinement of Nash-equilibrium suitable for games
of dynamic nature. We consider the game played by rational
participants aware of the game dynamics, and show that a
linear-in-miner-size cost (as in [28]) suffices for the existence
of a unique subgame perfect equilibrium.
Other work (E.g., [25], [26], [27]) analyzes bribing attacks
on the consensus mechanism of cryptocurrency blockchains.
Unlike this work, bribes in these papers compete with the
total block reward (not just a single transaction’s fee) and
lead miners to violate predefined behavior. These attacks are
therefore much more costly and more risky than the bribery
we consider, where a miner merely prioritizes transactions for
confirmation.
B. Transaction-Choice Optimization
MAD-HTLC incentivizes rational entities to act in a de-
sired way. It relies on the premise that all involved parties,
namely Alice, Bob and the miners are rational. Specifically,
that they monitor the blockchain state and issue transactions
accordingly.
Indeed, previous work [28], [47], [48], [49], [50], [51]
shows that this premise is prominent, and that system users and
miners engage in carefully-planned transaction placing, ma-
nipulating their publication times and offered fees to achieve
their goals. Other work [52], [53], [54], [55], [56], [57], [58]
asserts that the profitability of such actions is expected to rise
as the underlying systems mature, enabling constructions such
as MAD-HTLC which rely on the rationality assumption.
C. HTLC-Spec usage
A variety of smart contracts critically rely on HTLC-Spec .
To the best of our knowledge, all utilize HTLC, making them
vulnerable once miners behave rationally. We review some
prominent examples to illustrate the usefulness of HTLC-Spec .
a) Off-chain state channels: A widely-studied smart con-
tract construction [5], [8], [10], [9], [6], [59], [60], [12], [7],
[61] with implementations on various blockchains [4], [62],
[63], [64], [65], [66] is that of an off-chain channel between
two parties, Alice and Bob.
The channel has a state that changes as Alice and Bob
interact, e.g., pay one another by direct communication. In the
simplest case, the state is represented by a settlement trans-
action that Bob can place on the blockchain. The settlement
transaction terminates the channel by placing its final state
back in the blockchain. The transaction initiates a HTLC with
a hash image of Bob’s choice. Bob can redeem the contract
after the timeout, o alternatively, Alice can redeem before the
timeout if Bob had shared the preimage with her.
When Alice and Bob interact and update the channel state,
Bob revokes the previous settlement transaction by sending
his preimage to Alice. This guarantees that if Bob places a
revoked settlement transaction on the blockchain, Alice can
redeem the tokens within the timeout. Alternatively, if Alice
becomes unresponsive, Bob can place the transaction on the
blockchain and redeem the tokens after the timeout elapses.
Note that this scheme assumes synchronous access to the
blockchain – Alice should monitor the blockchain, identify
revoked-state transactions, and issue her own transaction be-
fore the revocation timeout elapses. To remove this burden,
services called Watchtowers [67], [68], [69] offer to replace
Alice in monitoring the blockchain and issuing transactions
when needed. However, these also require the same synchron-
ous access to the blockchain, and the placement of transactions
is still at the hands of bribable miners. MAD-HTLC can be
viewed as turning the miners themselves into watchtowers –
watchtowers that directly confirm the transactions, without a
bribable middleman.
b) Atomic swaps: These contracts enable token exchange
over multiple blockchain systems [11], [12], [13], [14], [15],
[70], where a set of parties transact their assets in an atomic
manner, i.e., either all transactions occur, or none.
Consider two users, Alice and Bob, that want to have an
atomic swap over two blockchains. Alice picks a preimage
and creates a HTLC on the first blockchain with timeout T 1.
Then, Bob creates a HTLC requiring the same preimage
(Bob knows only its hash) and a timeout T 2 < T 1 on the
second blockchain. Alice publishes a transaction on the second
blockchain, revealing the preimage and claiming the tokens.
Bob learns the preimage from Alice’s published transaction,
and publishes a transaction of his own on the first blockchain.
If Alice does not publish her transaction before T 2 elapses,
then the swap is canceled.
c) Zero-knowledge contingent payments: These [16],
[17], [18], [19], [20] are transactions allowing Bob to purchase
a secret from Alice such that he learns the secret if and only
if the payment is performed.
The construction is as follows. Bob creates a program that
decides if its given input is the requested secret, and sends it
to Alice.
Alice produces a zero-knowledge proof showing that e is
an encryption of an input positively evaluating the program
and h is the hash of the decryption key, and sends the proof
along with e and h to Bob.
Bob then verifies the proof and creates a HTLC allowing
Alice to redeem it with the preimage of h until a timeout.
If she does so, she receives the payment and Bob learns the
preimage and can decrypt e to get the requested data.
d) Cryptocurrency vaults: These designs [21], [22], [23],
[24] prevent theft of cryptocurrency tokens in case of a
compromised private key [71], [72], [73].
The center of the vault construction is a HTLC , initiated
by a single user with a secret key and a secret preimage that
are heavily protected, and another secret key that is easily
accessible to the user. To access the vault tokens the user can
either use the first key and the secret preimage (like Alice)
for immediate access, or the second key, providing a delayed
access (like Bob). If the second secret key is compromised by
an attacker that tries to access the vault tokens, then the user
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has time to access and protect the vault tokens prior to the
theft.
III. MODEL
We start by describing the system participants and how
they form a chain of blocks that contain transactions (§III-A).
Next, we explain how the transactions are parsed to define the
system state (§III-B). Finally, we detail the required contract
specification HTLC-Spec (§III-C).
A. Blockchain, Transactions and Miners
We assume an existing blockchain-based cryptocurrency
system, facilitating transactions of internal system tokens
among a set of entities. All entities have access to a PKI and
a random-oracle as a hash function H .
The blockchain serves as an append-only ledger storing the
system state. It is implemented as a linked list of elements
called blocks. A subset of the entities are called miners, who
aside from transacting tokens also extend the blockchain by
creating new blocks. We refer to non-mining entities as users.
There is a constant set of n miners. Each miner is as-
sociated a number representing its relative block-creation
rate, or mining power. Denote the mining power of miner i
by λi, where
∑n
1 λi = 1. Denote the minimal mining power
by λmin = min
i
λi. As in previous work [28], [74], [54],
[75], we consider these rates to be common knowledge,
since in practice miners can monitor the blockchain and infer
them [76].
Block creation is a discrete-time, memoryless stochastic
process. At each time step exactly one miner creates a block.
As in previous work [10], [9], [54], we disregard miners
deliberately [74], [77], [78] or unintentionally [79], [80],
[81] causing transient inconsistencies (called forks in the
blockchain literature). Blocks are indexed by their location in
the blockchain, we denote the first block by B1 and the j’th
block by Bj .
Transactions update the system state. An entity creates a
transaction locally, and can publish it to the other entities.
Transaction publication is instantaneous, and for simplicity
we abstract this process by considering published transactions
to be part of a publicly-shared data structure called the
mempool. As in previous work [9], [10], [54], all entities have
synchronous access to the mempool and the blockchain.
Unpublished and mempool transactions are unconfirmed,
and are yet to take effect. Miners can include unconfirmed
transactions of their choice when creating a block, thus con-
firming them and executing the stated token reassignment.
The system limits the number of included transactions per
block, and for simplicity (and without loss of generality) we
consider this limit to be one transaction per block.
The system progresses in steps. Each step j begins with
system entities publishing transactions to the mempool. Then,
a single miner is selected at random proportionally to its min-
ing power, that is, miner i is selected with probability λi. The
selected miner creates block Bj , either empty or containing a
single transaction, and adds it to the blockchain. This confirms
the included transaction, reassigning its tokens and awarding
that miner with its fee. The system then progresses to the next
step.
B. System State
The system state is a set of token and predicate pairs called
contracts. Transactions reassign tokens from one contract to
another. We say that a transaction redeems a contract if it
reassigns its tokens to one or more new initiated contracts.
To redeem a contract, a transaction must supply values
such that the contract predicate evaluated over them is true.
Transactions that result in negative predicate value are invalid,
and cannot be included in a block. We simply disregard such
transactions.
We say that an entity owns tokens if she is the only entity
able to redeem their contract, i.e., the only entity that can
provide input data in a transaction that results in positive
evaluation of the contract’s predicate.
Transactions reassign tokens as follows. Each transaction
lists one or more input contracts that it redeems, each with
its respective provided values. Each transaction also lists one
or more output contracts that it initiates. A transaction is only
valid if the aggregate amount in the output contracts is not
larger than the amount in its redeemed input contracts. The
difference between the two amounts is the transaction’s fee.
The fee is thus set by the entity that creates the transaction.
The system state is derived by parsing the transactions in the
blockchain by their order. Each transaction reassigns tokens
thus updating the contract set. Transaction fees are reassigned
to a contract supplied by the miner that included them in a
block.
Two transactions conflict if they redeem the same contract.
Both of them might be valid, but only one can be placed in the
blockchain. Once one of them is confirmed, a block containing
the other is invalid. We disregard such invalid blocks, and
assume miners only produce valid blocks.
There is always at least one unconfirmed valid transaction
in the mempool, and the highest offered fee by any mempool
transaction is f , referred to as the base fee. Miners act
rationally to maximize their received fees (§II-B). Users are
also rational, and prefer to offer the minimal sufficient fee for
having their transactions confirmed.
Predicates have access to three primitives:
• VerSig (sig; pk): validate that a digital signature sig
provided by the redeeming transaction (on the redeeming
transaction, excluding the signature itself) matches a
public key pk specified in the contract.
• VerPreImg (x; y): validate that a hash preimage x
provided by the redeeming transaction matches an im-
age y specified in the contract, i.e., that H (x) = y.
• VerTimeout (T ): validate that the transaction redeeming
the contract is in a block at least T blocks after the
transaction initiating it.
A predicate can include arbitrary logic composing those
primitives. In predicates that offer multiple redeem options
via or conditions, we refer to each option as a redeem path.
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We note that once a transaction is published its content
becomes available to all entities. We say that an entity knows
data if it is available to it.
C. HTLC-Spec Specification
We formalize as HTLC-Spec the following contract spe-
cification, used in variety of blockchain-based systems and
algorithms [4], [7], [8], [9], [10], [17], [18], [19], [11], [12],
[13], [14]. HTLC-Spec is specified for two users, Alice and
Bob. It is parametrized by a hash image and a timeout, and
contains a certain deposit amount, vdep. Alice gets the deposit
if she publishes a matching preimage before the timeout
elapses, otherwise Bob does.
In a blockchain setting, Alice and Bob redeem the deposit
with a transaction that offers a fee. We assume the contract
token amount vdep is larger than the base fee f , otherwise the
contract is not applicable.
The redeeming transaction by Alice or Bob (according to the
scenario) should require a fee negligibly larger than the base
fee f . Specifically, the fee amount is independent of vdep.
To construct HTLC-Spec , Alice and Bob choose the in-
cluded hash image, the timeout, and the token amount, vdep.
Then either of them issues a transaction that generates the
contract with vdep tokens and the parametrized predicate.
Either Alice or Bob initially knows the preimage, depending
on the scenario.
For simplicity, we assume that Alice either knows the preim-
age when the transaction initiating HTLC-Spec is confirmed
on the blockchain, or she never does.
IV. MAD-HTLC DESIGN
We present MAD-HTLC , an implementation of HTLC-
Spec . MAD-HTLC comprises two contracts — MH-Dep ,
the core implementation of the HTLC-Spec functionality, and
MH-Col , an auxiliary collateral contract used to disincentivize
spiteful behavior by Bob.
Alice and Bob execute HTLC-Spec by initiating MH-Dep
with vdep > f and MH-Col with vcol > f tokens, respectively.
We denote the block including the initiating transaction by Bj .
The intended way Alice and Bob should interact with
MAD-HTLC is as follows. If Alice knows the predefined
preimage preimga she publishes a transaction tx
dep
a offering
a fee f depa > f that redeems MH-Dep . She must publish tx
dep
a
before the creation of block Bj+T−1. If Alice does not know
the predefined preimage preimga she does not publish any
transaction.
Bob observes the published transactions in the mempool,
watching for txdepa . If by the creation of block Bj+T−1 Alice
did not publish txdepa then Bob publishes tx
dep+col
b with a
fee f dep+colb > f , revealing preimgb, redeeming both tx
dep
b and
MH-Col . If Alice did publish txdepa by block Bj+T−1 then Bob
publishes txcolb with a fee f
col
b > f , redeeming only MH-Col .
We now present the specifics of MH-Dep (§IV-A) and MH-
Col (§IV-B).
Predicate 1: MH-Dep
Parameters: pka, pkb, T,H, imga, imgb
MH-Dep (preimg1, preimg2, sig) :=
1 (VerPreImg (preimg1; imga) ∧ VerSig (sig; pka)) ∨
2 (VerPreImg (preimg2; imgb) ∧ VerSig (sig; pkb) ∧ VerTimeout (T )) ∨
3 (VerPreImg (preimg1; imga) ∧ VerPreImg (preimg2; imgb))
Bob publishes Bob doesn’t publish
Alice publishes Miner Alice
Alice doesn’t publish Bob —
Table I: Redeeming entity of MH-Dep .
Bob publishes Bob doesn’t publish
Alice publishes Miner Bob
Alice doesn’t publish Bob —
Table II: Redeeming entity of MH-Col .
A. MH-Dep
The MH-Dep contract is initiated with vdep tokens. Its
predicate is parametrized with Alice’s and Bob’s public
keys, pka and pkb, respectively; A hash image of the pre-
defined secret imga = H (preimga) such that any entity other
than Alice and Bob does not know preimga, and Alice or Bob
know preimga according to on the specific use case; Another
hash image imgb such that H (preimgb) = imgb, where only
Bob knows preimgb; and a timeout T . The contract has three
redeem paths, presented in Predicate 1. Table I shows the
redeeming entity of MH-Dep .
In the first path (line 1), Alice can redeem MH-Dep by
creating a transaction including preimga and siga, a signature
created using her secret key ska. Such a transaction can be
included even in the next block Bj+1. This path is only
available to Alice, since only she ever knows ska.
In the second path (line 2), Bob can redeem MH-Dep
by creating a transaction including preimgb and a signature
created using his secret key skb. Such a transaction can be
included in a block at least T blocks after MH-Dep’s initiation,
that is, not earlier than block Bj+T . This path is only available
to Bob, since only he ever knows skb.
In the third path (line 3), any entity can redeem MH-Dep
by creating a transaction including both preimga and preimgb.
A transaction taking the third redeem path does not require
a digital signature, and can be included even in the next
block Bj+1. This path is therefore available to any entity that
knows both preimga and preimgb.
B. MH-Col
The MH-Col contract is initiated with vcol tokens. Its
predicate is parametrized with Bob’s public key pkb; the hash
image of the predefined secret imga = H (preimga) such that
any entity other than Alice and Bob does not know preimga,
and Alice and Bob know preimga based on the specific use
case; the hash image imgb such that H (preimgb) = imgb,
where only Bob knows preimgb; and a timeout T . It has two
redeem paths, presented in Predicate 2. Table II shows the
intended redeeming entity of MH-Col .
Both paths are constrained by the timeout T , meaning a
redeeming transaction can only be included in a block at
least T blocks after the MH-Col initiation (line 1).
5
Predicate 2: MH-Col
Parameters: pkb, T,H, imga, imgb
MH-Col (preimg1, preimg2, sig) :=
1 VerTimeout (T )∧
2
[
VerSig (sig; pkb) ∨
3 (VerPreImg (preimg1; imga) ∧ VerPreImg (preimg2; imgb))
]
In the first path (line 2), Bob can redeem MH-Col by
creating a transaction including a signature created using his
secret key skb. Only Bob can redeem MH-Col using this path
as he is the only one able to produce such a signature. This
path allows Bob to claim the collateral tokens in case either he
or Alice, but not both, publish a transaction redeeming MH-
Dep .
The second path (line 3) allows any entity to redeem
MH-Col by creating a transaction including both preimga
and preimgb, not requiring any digital signature. This path
allows miners to claim the MH-Col tokens in case Bob tries
contesting Alice on redeeming MH-Dep , incentivizing him to
refrain from doing so.
V. MAD-HTLC ANALYSIS
To reason about MAD-HTLC ’s security we must take into
account miner behavior. Miners are the ones that confirm
transactions, and they can behave in unintended and undesired
ways to increase their gains. We formalize MAD-HTLC as a
game played by Alice, Bob and the miners (§V-A), and show
that they are all incentivized to act as intended (§V-B). We
conclude by discussing mitigations in a stronger threat model,
where either Alice or Bob have mining power (§V-C).
A. MAD-HTLC Game
The MAD-HTLC game begins when the MH-Dep and MH-
Col are initiated in some block Bj . The game, which we
denote by ΓMH, comprises T rounds, representing the creation
of blocks Bj+1, ...,Bj+T . Each round begins with Alice and
Bob publishing transactions, followed by a miner creating a
block including a transaction of her choice.
Alice and Bob’s strategies are their choices of published
transactions — which transactions to publish, when, and with
what fee. Miner strategies are the choices of which transaction
to include in a block if they are chosen to create one.
To accommodate for the stochastic nature of the game [82]
we consider entity utilities as the expected number of tokens
they own at game conclusion, i.e., after the creation of T
blocks. Alice and Bob’s utilities depend on the inclusion of
their transactions and their offered fees, and miner utilities on
their transaction inclusion choices.
We present the game details (§V-A1) and the suitable
solution concept (§V-A2).
1) Game Details: The game progresses in rounds, where
each round comprises two steps. First, Alice, then Bob altern-
ately publish transactions, until both do not wish to publish
any more.
Note that all published transactions of the current and
previous rounds are in the mempool. Since miners prefer
higher fees, for the analysis we ignore any transaction tx if
there is another transaction tx’ such that both were created by
Rounds:
ΓMH (1, red) ΓMH (2, ·) · · · ΓMH (T − 1, ·) ΓMH (T, ·)
1 2 · · · T − 1 T
Figure 1: ΓMH subgames.
the same entity, both redeem the same contracts, and tx’ pays
a higher fee than tx or arrives before tx.
Tokens are discrete, hence there is a finite number of fees
Alice and Bob may offer, meaning this step is finite.
Then, a single miner is picked at random proportionally
to its mining power and gets to create a block including a
transaction of her choice, receiving its transaction fees. Each
miner can also create a new transaction and include it in her
block.
a) Subgames: The dynamic and turn-altering nature of
the game allows us to define subgames, representing suffixes
of ΓMH. For any k ∈ [1, T ] we refer to the game starting just
before round k as the k’th subgame (Fig. 1).
Note that as miners create blocks and confirm transactions,
the system state, including the state of MAD-HTLC , changes.
Specifically, if MH-Dep is already redeemed, future blocks
do not allow inclusion of conflicting transactions that redeem
MH-Dep as well.
Hence, when considering MAD-HTLC states we need to
distinguish whether MH-Dep is redeemable or irredeemable,
which we denote by red and irred, respectively. We also note
that MH-Col cannot be redeemed until the very last T ’th
subgame.
Consequently, each subgame k ∈ [1, T ] is defined by the
number of remaining blocks to be created k, and the MH-
Dep state s ∈ {red, irred}. We denote such a subgame
by ΓMH (k, s).
We use · to denote sets of subgames. For example, we
denote by ΓMH (·, red) the set of subgames where the contract
state s is red.
We refer to ΓMH (T, ·) as the final subgames, as once played,
the full game ΓMH is complete. We refer to all other subgames
as non-final.
The game begins when there are T blocks to be created,
Alice and Bob did not publish any transactions, and the
MH-Dep is redeemable. Thus, the initial, complete game
is ΓMH (1, red).
Once the first round of a non-final subgame is complete,
the system transitions to the subsequent subgame.
b) Actions: Alice and Bob’s actions are the publication
of transactions in any ΓMH (·, ·) subgame.
Alice can only redeem MH-Dep , hence has a single trans-
action of interest txdepa , offering fee of f
dep
a tokens. Note tx
dep
a
has to outbid unrelated transactions and thus has to offer
a fee f depa > f , however, cannot offer more tokens than
the redeemed ones, so f depa < vdep. This transaction utilizes
the first redeem path of MH-Dep , hence publishing it also
publishes preimga.
Bob can redeem MH-Dep , MH-Col or both. We thus con-
sider three transactions of interest: txdepb , redeeming tx
dep
b while
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offering fee f depb ; tx
col
b , redeeming MH-Col while offering
fee f colb ; and tx
dep+col
b , redeeming both tx
dep
b and MH-Col while
offering fee f dep+colb . To redeem MH-Dep Bob uses the second
redeem path, hence publishing transactions txdepb or tx
dep+col
b
also publishes preimgb. Similarly to Alice’s fee considerations,
Bob’s transactions have to outbid unrelated transactions, and
cannot offer more tokens than they redeem. We get that f <
f depb < v
dep, f < f colb < v
col and f < f dep+colb < v
dep + vcol.
A miner’s action is the choice of a transaction to include
if she is chosen to create a block. First, a miner can include
a transaction unrelated to MAD-HTLC in any ΓMH (·, ·) sub-
game.
She can also include any of the following transactions,
assuming they were previously published, and as a function
of the contract state:
• txdepa if MH-Dep is redeemable, that is, in
any ΓMH (·, red);
• txcolb if the timeout has elapsed, that is, in any Γ
MH (T, ·);
and
• txdepb or tx
dep+col
b if the timeout has elapsed and MH-Dep
is redeemable, that is, in any ΓMH (T, red).
Conditioned on published transactions, a miner can also
create and include the following transactions:
• Transaction txdepm redeeming MH-Dep herself, using the
third redeem path, and getting the vdep tokens of MH-Dep
as reward. This action is only available if the miner knows
both preimga and preimgb, and if MH-Dep is redeemable,
that is, in any ΓMH (·, red) subgame where txdepa and either
of txdepb or tx
dep+col
b were published.
• Transaction txcolm redeeming MH-Col herself, using the
second redeem path, and getting the vcol tokens of MH-
Col as reward. This action is only available if the miner
knows both preimga and preimgb, and the timeout has
elapsed, that is, in any ΓMH (T, red) subgame where txdepa
and either of txdepb or tx
dep+col
b were published.
• Transaction txdep+colm redeeming both MH-Dep and MH-
Col herself, using the respective third and second redeem
paths, and getting the vdep + vcol tokens of MH-Dep and
MH-Col as reward. This action is only available if the
miner knows both preimga and preimgb, the MH-Dep
is redeemable, and the timeout has elapsed, that is, in
subgame ΓMH (T, red) where txdepa and either of txdepb
or txdep+colb were published.
We disregard actions that are trivially dominated [44], such
as Alice and Bob sharing their secret keys or publishing the
relevant preimages not via a transaction, or miners creating an
empty block.
c) Strategy: A strategy σ is a mapping from each sub-
game to a respective feasible action, stating that an entity takes
that action in the subgame. We call the strategy vector of all
entities in a game a strategy profile, denoted by σ¯.
d) Utility: Recall an entity’s utility is her expected ac-
cumulated token amount at game conclusion. We define the
utility of an entity in a subgame as the expected token amount
she accumulates within the subgame until its conclusion. We
denote the utility of entity i when all entities follow σ¯ in
subgame ΓMH (k, s) by ui
(
σ¯,ΓMH (k, s)
)
.
2) Solution Concept: Note that block-creation rates, entity
utilities and their rationality are all common knowledge, and
that when choosing an action an entity is aware of the current
system state. That means any subgame ΓMH (k, s) is of perfect
information [83], [84]. We are thus interested in strategy
profiles that are subgame perfect equilibria [39], [40], [41],
[42], [43], [44], [45], [46].
A strategy profile σ¯ is a subgame perfect equilibrium
in ΓMH (k, s) if, for any subgame, no entity can increase her
utility by deviating to a different strategy, where it knows how
the other players would react based on their perfect knowledge.
This implies that for each subgame, the actions stated by σ¯
are a Nash equilibrium.
We say that a prescribed strategy profile is incentive com-
patible if it is a subgame perfect equilibrium, and the utility of
each player is not lower than her utility in any other subgame
perfect equilibrium. So an entity cannot deviate to increase
her utility, and there are no other more favorable equilibria.
Our analysis utilizes the common technique of backward
induction [85], [86], [87], [46], suitable for perfect-information
finite games. Intuitively, to determine its action, a player
analyzes the game outcome for each possible action, repeating
the process recursively for each possible game suffix.
B. MAD-HTLC Incentive Compatibility
We now show that MAD-HTLC satisfies HTLC-Spec . For
that, we show the prescribed behavior of MAD-HTLC is
incentive compatible and implements the HTLC-Spec .
We first analyze Alice’s and Bob’s utilities when both follow
the prescribed strategy, starting with the scenario where Alice
knows the preimage preimga.
Lemma V.1. In ΓMH (1, red), if Alice knows preimga and
Alice and Bob both follow the prescribed strategies, then
miners’ best-response strategy leads to Alice redeeming MH-
Dep and receiving vdep−f depa tokens, and Bob redeeming MH-
Col for vcol − f colb tokens.
Proof. The prescribed strategy states that Alice publishes txdepa
during the first T − 1 rounds, and that Bob publishes txcolb in
round T .
Note that Bob does not publish txdepb and tx
dep+col
b , hence
miners do not know preimgb. The transactions tx
dep
a and txcolb
offer f depa and f colb fees, respectively, both greater than the base
fee f .
The induced subgames therefore enable miners to in-
clude txdepa in one of the first T −1 blocks, and including txcolb
in the last one. Using backward induction shows the subgame
perfect equilibrium is to include txdepa in its published round,
and txcolb in the last.
So both txdepa and txcolb are included in blocks, and Alice and
Bob get vdep − f depa and vcol − f colb tokens, respectively.
Lemma V.2. In ΓMH (1, red), if Alice does not know preimga
and Alice and Bob both follow the prescribed strategies, then
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miners’ best-response strategy leads to Bob redeeming both
MH-Dep and MH-Col for vdep + vcol − f dep+colb tokens, and
Alice gets none.
Proof. As Alice does not know preimga she does not publish
any transaction, hence redeems no contract and receives no
tokens.
By the prescribed strategy Bob publishes txdep+colb , offering
fee f dep+colb > f and revealing preimgb. However, preimga is
not published, so miners cannot redeem MH-Dep and MH-Col
themselves.
Therefore, miners maximize their utility by includ-
ing txdep+colb in the last round.
That means txdep+colb is included in a block, and Alice and
Bob get 0 and vdep + vcol − f dep+colb tokens, respectively.
We now consider potential deviations from the prescribed
strategy, showing they are strictly dominated. We begin by
showing that if Alice and Bob contend then the miners do not
take their transactions in the last round.
Lemma V.3. In the last round of the game, i.e. sub-
game ΓMH (T, ·), if txdepa and either txdepb or txdep+colb are
published then miners’ best-response strategy is not to include
any of Alice’s or Bob’s transactions in this round.
Proof. Since Alice and Bob published their transactions,
both preimga and preimgb are available to all miners. There-
fore, any miner can create a transaction redeeming MH-Dep
and MH-Col herself.
If MH-Dep is irredeemable
(
ΓMH (T, irred)
)
, then miners
can create txcolm and redeem MH-Col themselves in round T ,
getting vcol tokens as reward. Alternatively, if txcolb is published
they can include it in a block, getting a fee of f colb tokens.
As f colb < v
col, including txcolb is strictly dominated by
including txcolm . In this case miners can also not include tx
dep
a
as the MH-Dep is irredeemable.
If MH-Dep is redeemable
(
ΓMH (T, red)
)
, miners can also
create txdep+colm , include it in a block, and get vdep + vcol in
reward. Alternatively, they can include either txdepa , tx
dep
b , tx
col
b
or txdep+colb (whichever was published). However, any of these
offers fees lower than vdep + vcol, making them strictly-
dominated by including txdep+colm .
In either scenario including any of Alice’s or Bob’s transac-
tions results with a strictly lower reward, hence miners avoid
doing so.
Now, consider Alice’s potential deviations. The following
lemma shows these do not increase her utility.
Lemma V.4. In ΓMH (1, red), Alice cannot increase her utility
by deviating from the prescribed strategy.
Proof. First, if Alice does not know preimga, she can take no
action, hence trivially complies with the prescribed strategy.
If Alice does know preimga, then her possible deviations
are not publishing txdepa at all, or publishing it only in the last
round T .
Not publishing txdepa at all is strictly dominated — she gets
no tokens; if she instead abides by the prescribed strategy then
she cannot get a lower revenue but can get more, e.g., if Bob
also follows the prescribed strategy (Lemma V.1).
The inclusion of txdepa in the last block depends on what
transactions Bob publishes throughout the game (Lemma V.3).
That is, if Bob published either txdepb or tx
dep+col
b then miners’
best-response is not to include txdepa , and Alice gets no tokens.
Otherwise, miners’ best response is to include the transaction
that offers the highest fee, which can be either txdepa or another,
resulting with Alice receiving vdep − f depa and zero tokens,
respectively.
So, Alice cannot gain, and in several scenarios strictly lose,
by deviating from her prescribed strategy.
We now consider Bob’s potential deviation.
Lemma V.5. In ΓMH (1, red), Bob cannot increase his utility
by deviating from the prescribed strategy.
Proof. Consider all of Bob’s possible actions. His potential
maximal utility is from having txdep+colb included, which he
obtains by following the prescribed strategy in the scenario
where Alice does not know preimga (Lemma V.2). So, he has
no incentive to deviate in this case.
Now, consider the case where Alice knows preimga, hence
according to Lemma V.4 publishes txdepa in the first T − 1
rounds.
Bob can publish txdepb , tx
dep+col
b and tx
col
b throughout the
game. If he publishes txdepb or tx
dep+col
b in any round then none
of his transactions are included (Lemma V.3) and he gets no
reward. However, if he only publishes txcolb then by Lemma V.1
he receives vcol − f colb > 0 tokens.
Not publishing txcolb at all results with the minimal utility
of 0, and an earlier publication still leads miners to include
both txcolb and tx
dep
a (cf. V.5), obtaining the same utility as of
the prescribed behavior.
Following directly from Lemma V.4 and Lemma V.5 we
obtain:
Corollary 1. The prescribed strategy of MAD-HTLC is a
unique subgame perfect equilibrium, and as such, incentive
compatible.
We are now ready to prove our main theorem:
Theorem V.6. MAD-HTLC satisfies HTLC-Spec.
Proof. The prescribed strategy of MAD-HTLC is incentive
compatible (Corollary 1), hence Alice and Bob abide by it.
By Lemma V.2 and Lemma V.1, the MAD-HTLC pre-
scribed strategy results with the outcomes specified in HTLC-
Spec .
Note that matching the HTLC-Spec , the prescribed strategy
states the redeeming transaction fee should be negligibly larger
than f , and is independent of vdep.
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Irrational Miners: MAD-HTLC ’s design deters Bob
from unjustly contending MH-Dep – Bob knows rational
miners will seize his funds if he acts dishonestly.
However, even in the presence of unsophisticated (irrational)
miners, MAD-HTLC still satisfies HTLC-Spec . The common
mining logic [88], [89], [90], [91] as of today has miners
myopically optimize for the next block. Since Bob’s trans-
action can only be confirmed in the last round, these miners
will simply include Alice’s transaction, achieving the desired
outcome.
Only miners that are sophisticated enough to be non-myopic
but not sophisticated enough to take advantage of the third path
would cooperate with the attack. But even in the presence of
such miners, it is sufficient for one miner (or user) to take
advantage of the third path during the T rounds in order to
thwart the attack.
C. Mining Alice or Bob
The analysis of MAD-HTLC ’s incentive compatibility as-
sumes that Alice and Bob have no mining capabilities or,
equivalently, that they do not collude with any miner. Remov-
ing this assumption extends the game space considerably, and
brings in timing and probability considerations that are outside
the scope of this work, as the following examples show.
Consider a scenario where Alice publishes a transaction
redeeming MH-Dep , and Bob is colluding with a miner to
obtain the MH-Dep tokens. Bob can privately share preimgb,
enabling the miner to redeem MH-Dep herself using the third
redeem path.
Alternatively, assume Alice knows preimga and so should
redeem MH-Dep . Alice colludes with a miner to obtain the
MH-Col tokens as well. She deliberately stalls publishing txdepa
until round T . Bob, believing she is defunct, publishes a
transaction to redeem MH-Col. Having observed preimgb
included in Bob’s transaction, Alice shares her own preimga
to the miner. Now the miner can redeem both MH-Dep but
also MH-Col .
A possible solution to these can be creating multiple MH-
Dep and MH-Col instances with the same secrets, but each
with a different timeout. In the case of a miner redeeming
either of these by providing preimga and preimgb, they become
public, hence letting all miners redeem all future contracts.
This requires the colluding miner to create the blocks matching
the different timeouts, which requires significant mining power
to achieve with non-negligible (in the number of timeouts)
probability.
VI. MAD-HTLC IMPLEMENTATION
To demonstrate the efficacy of MAD-HTLC, we evaluate it
on Bitcoin. We discuss the deployment of MAD-HTLC and
its overhead (§VI-A), and our implementation of a framework
for implementing miner rationality (§VI-B) used to facilitate
the contract guarantees.
Name
Script
size
[bytes]
Redeem
path
Redeeming
transaction size
[bytes]
HTLC 99
Alice 291
Bob 259
MH-Dep 129
Alice 323
Bob 322
Miner 282
MH-Col 88
Bob 248
Miner 241
Table III: Script and redeeming transaction sizes.
A. MAD-HTLC Bitcoin Implementation
We implement MH-Dep and MH-Col in Bitcoin’s
Script [34] language. We also implement a version of the
standard HTLC for reference. We bring the details in App. A.
Bitcoin’s transaction fees are determined by the transaction
byte sizes due to the block size limit. Our contracts use
P2SH [92] (non SegWit [93]) addresses, that is, the initiating
transactions contain only the hashes of the scripts they initiate
rather than the scripts themselves. Each contract initiation
within a transaction therefore requires 28 bytes: 8 bytes for
the token amount, and 20 bytes for the predicate script hash.
The redeeming transactions provide the full predicate script
and the required input data. Table III presents the script and
redeeming transaction sizes of HTLC , MH-Dep and MH-Col .
A transaction redeeming MH-Dep is about 50 bytes larger
than one redeeming HTLC . At the current Bitcoin common
fees [94] and exchange rate [95] implies an additional cost of
a mere $0.02.
Including the auxiliary MH-Col implies an additional cost
of about $0.10. However, for lack of clear incentive for spiteful
behavior on Bob’s account, system designers might prefer to
avoid including it to reduce the overhead.
Further size-reduction optimizations such as using SegWit
transactions and merging multiple transactions can also be
made, but are outside the scope of this work.
We note that for off-chain channels [4], [5], [6], [7], [8], [9],
[10], [59], [60], [12], [61], [67] the HTLC or MAD-HTLC is
actually used on the blockchain only in a unilateral channel
closure, indicating an abnormal behavior by either or both
parties. In the common case it never touches the blockchain,
and incurs no overhead for the additional security.
We deployed multiple three MH-Dep instances on the
Bitcoin main net, and successfully redeemed them using the
three redeem paths. We also deployed two MH-Col instances,
successfully redeemed using the two paths. Table IV shows
the IDs of the initiating and redeeming transactions1.
B. Rational Miner Infrastructure
By default, cryptocurrency clients [88], [89], [90], [91] only
perform basic transaction-inclusion optimizations. The capa-
city of each block is typically bounded, e.g., by storage volume
1https://www.blockchain.com/
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Description Transaction ID
Initiate MH-Dep d032175260145055860296cbca8f7462
4f30334ddf948d5da12f0c7414d80cc0
MH-Dep path 1 33c957bb2f75e797d240a38504ce49a3
aeaaceb72f8577096b4f2ff23f5b3a1e
MH-Dep path 2 cd090c90afaacc0e2648834fe96f6177
ec2f967b7e50245537afdaf0d5a80263
MH-Dep path 3 505c7f1f3862b7f5c6b78f72cce5e37a
655b946fbdc7d03526055f7ea206781a
Initiate MH-Col ea830dba56000b3486cf1c5122fedcf8
8169ab596536fd406b4f989e7761c1b4
MH-Col path 1 4c06ebff8de6bb56242c75849767a633
9e40a0442f815a2487fd9d6237c51b9f
MH-Col path 2 68270b94ca80281e31e193dac6779d3a
22d2799fe2afff8cef66c0ec6b420c88
Table IV: MAD-HTLC Main-net experiment transaction id.
in Bitcoin [96] and by processing overhead in Ethereum [97]),
and current optimization practice is to fill each block with
transactions paying the highest fees.
This is a myopic approach, limited only to considering
transactions that can be included in the next block. Specific-
ally, Bitcoin Core, which is used by about 97% of current
Bitcoin nodes [35], maintains a local mempool data structure
that contains unconfirmed transactions whose timeouts (if any)
have elapsed.
This implementation does not allow users to control trans-
action choices. We note that this limitation is not a con-
sensus rule, but an implementation choice in the current
software. Taking more elaborate considerations into account
when choosing transactions is not a violation of legal miner
behavior and does not affect the overall system’s specified
behavior.
As noted (§II-B), optimizing the revenue from transactions
is becoming more important for miners over time. To demon-
strate the ease of achieving broader optimizations, including
non-myopic considerations, we implemented rational miner
infrastructure (RMI), an infrastructure allowing to easily in-
corporate any logic over Bitcoin Core received transactions.
RMI’s main design goal is to enable users to deploy their
own optimization algorithms. For that, it comprises a patched
C++ Bitcoin Core node, with added RPC commands, and a
Python script (Figure 2, new components shaded), working as
follows.
When the node receives a new transaction, instead of
directly placing it in its mempool, it pushes the transaction to a
designated new transaction queue. The Python script monitors
this queue with a dedicated RPC, fetches new transactions and
parses them. Then, based on the implemented optimization
algorithm, it can instruct the node how to handle the transac-
tion – insert it to the mempool, discard it, or keep it for future
use. The Python script can also generate new transactions, and
send them to the node.
The changes to Bitcoin Core include only 140 lines of code,
allowing miners to easily incorporate rationality in Python
script using the prevalent client implementation.
We implemented and locally tested the Python script for
enforcing MAD-HTLC by taking advantage of the opportun-
ities it provides miners to increase their revenue. We screen
New tx
Patched Bitcoin Core (C++)
mempool
Tx Queue
Tx Buffer
1
1
Rationality Logic
(Python)
2
New txs
4
Buffer 
instructions
5
Insert tx to mempool
Insert generated tx
3
Choose txs for
mempool
Figure 2: RMI design, new components shaded.
received transactions, tease out Alice and Bob’s preimages,
and create a transaction redeeming the MAD-HTLC contracts
using the extracted preimages. This implementation required
350 lines of Python code.
VII. HTLC
The prevalent implementation of HTLC-Spec is a dir-
ect translation of the specification to a single contract
called HTLC (§VII-A).
It relies on the premise that miners benevolently enforce
the desired execution, namely include Alice’s transaction in
a block before the timeout elapses. However, this assumption
contradicts the core principle of cryptocurrency permissionless
systems — miners operate to make profit [48], [54], [56], [49],
[57], [52], [53], [55], and include transactions that benefit
their personal gains [47], [50], [51]. Specifically, Bob can
incentivize miners with a bribe [28], [26], [27] to exclude
Alice’s transaction until the timeout elapses, and then redeem
the HTLC himself.
We analyze the security of HTLC by formalizing the
game played among the entities (§VII-B), and showing how
cheap Bob’s required bribe is (§VII-C). We show miner fee
optimization is easy by implementing a bribery-accepting (i.e.,
rational) miner (§VII-D), and conclude by estimating the actual
attack cost using numbers from operational contracts (§VII-E).
A. Construction
Alice and Bob execute HTLC-Spec by initiating a single
HTLC initiated with vdep tokens. The HTLC ’s predicate
is parameterized with Alice’s and Bob’s public keys, pka
and pkb, respectively; A hash image of the predefined
secret imga = H (preimga) such that any entity other
than Alice and Bob does not know preimga (Alice or Bob
know preimga based on the specific use case); and a timeout T .
The HTLC has two redeem paths, presented in Predic-
ate 3. In the first path (line 1), Alice can redeem it with a
transaction including preimga and siga, a signature with her
secret key ska. In the second path (line 2), Bob can redeem it
with a transaction including sigb, a signature with his secret
key skb. This transaction can only be included in a block at
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Predicate 3: HTLC
Parameters: pka, pkb, T,H, imga
HTLC (preimg, sig) :=
1 (VerPreImg (preimg; imga) ∧ VerSig (sig; pka))∨
2 (VerSig (sig; pkb) ∧ VerTimeout (T ))
least T blocks after HTLC ’s initiation, that is, not earlier than
block Bj+T .
Note that as only Alice and Bob know their respective secret
keys, other entities cannot redeem the HTLC .
The intended way Alice and Bob should interact with HTLC
is as follows. If Alice knows the predefined preimage preimga,
she publishes a transaction txha offering a fee f
h
a > f that re-
deems the HTLC . She publishes this transaction right after the
creation of block Bj , that is, before the creation of block Bj+1.
If Alice does not know the predefined preimage preimga she
does not publish any transactions.
Bob observes the published transactions in the mempool,
watching for txha. If by block Bj+T−1 Alice did not publish txha
then Bob publishes txhb with a fee f
h
b > f , redeeming the
HTLC . If Alice did publish txha by block Bj+T−1 then Bob
does not publish any transactions.
B. HTLC Game
HTLC operation gives rise to a game, denoted by ΓH,
played among Alice, Bob and the miners. It is a very similar
to that of the MAD-HTLC game (§V-A), and we therefore
present only the differences.
a) Subgames: The game state is simply the state of
the HTLC , which can be either redeemable or irredeemable,
denoted by red and irred, respectively.
The game begins when there are T blocks to be created,
Alice and Bob did not publish any transactions, and the HTLC
is redeemable. Thus, the initial, complete game is ΓH (1, red).
b) Actions: Alice can redeem the HTLC with a trans-
action txha, offering f
h
a tokens as fee. Note tx
h
a has to outbid
unrelated transactions and thus has to offer a fee f ha > f ,
however, cannot offer more tokens than the redeemed ones,
so f ha < v
dep. Alice redeems HTLC using the first redeem
path, so txha can be confirmed in any round.
Bob can redeem HTLC with a transaction txhb, offering f
h
b
tokens as fee. Similarly, f hb is bounded such that f < f
h
b <
vdep. Bob redeems HTLC using the second redeem path, so txhb
can only be confirmed in the last round.
A miner can take the following actions:
• Include a transaction unrelated to HTLC in any ΓH (·, ·)
subgame.
• Include txha if the HTLC is redeemable, that is, in
any ΓH (·, red) subgame.
• Include txhb if the timeout has elapsed and the HTLC is
redeemable, that is, in any ΓH (T, red) subgame.
C. Bribe Attack Analysis
We now show the HTLC prescribed strategy (§VII-A) is
not incentive compatible. Specifically, we show that if Alice
commits to the prescribed strategy, then Bob strictly gains by
publishing a conflicting transaction as well, outbidding Alice’s
fee, thus incentivizing miners to exclude Alice’s transaction
and include his instead.
So, let Alice publish txha with fee f
h
a in the first round, and
Bob publish a transaction txhb with fee f
h
b >
f ha−f
λmin
+ f .
Focusing on miner actions, we show through a series of
lemmas they are incentivized to include txhb and to exclude tx
h
a,
resulting with lower utility for Alice, higher utility for Bob,
and a violation of the HTLC-Spec .
Denote by σ¯ the best response strategy of miners in this
setting.
First, we show miner utilities for subgames where the HTLC
is irredeemable.
Lemma VII.1. For any k ∈ [1, T ], the utility of
miner i in subgame ΓH (k, irred) is ui
(
σ¯,ΓH (k, irred)
)
=
λi (T − k + 1) f .
Proof. Since HTLC is irredeemable, the only available action
for miners is to include an unrelated transaction, yielding a
reward of f .
Consider any ΓH (k, irred) subgame. There are T − k + 1
remaining blocks to be created, and miner i creates any of
them with probability λi. This scenario can be viewed as
a series of T − k + 1 Bernoulli trials with success prob-
ability λi. The number of successes is therefore Binomially
distributed, and the expected number of blocks miner i creates
is λi (T − k + 1). The reward for each block is f , so miner i’s
utility is ui
(
σ¯,ΓH (k, irred)
)
= λi (T − k + 1) f .
We now consider miner utilities for ΓH (·, red) subgames,
where the HTLC is redeemable. We begin with the final
subgame ΓH (T, red), creating block Bj+T .
Lemma VII.2. Choosing to include txhb is a unique subgame
perfect equilibrium in ΓH (T, red), and miner i’s utility when
doing so is ui
(
σ¯,ΓH (T, red)
)
= λif
h
b.
Proof. In the ΓH (T, red) subgame, the miner that creates the
block has three transactions to pick from: She can include an
unrelated transaction for the base fee f , txha for f
h
a, or tx
h
b
for f hb.
As f hb >
f ha−f
λmin
+ f , 0 < λmin < 1 and f ha > f it follows
that f hb > f
h
a and f
h
b > f .
That means including txhb yields strictly greater reward
than all other actions, thus being a unique subgame perfect
equilibrium in this subgame.
Miner i creates the block with probability λi, and so her
expected profit, i.e. utility, is ui
(
σ¯,ΓH (T, red)
)
= λif
h
b.
We now move on to consider any earlier (k ∈ [1, T − 1])
subgame (Blocks Bj+1 to Bj+T−1 ) where the HTLC is
redeemable.
Lemma VII.3. For any k ∈ [1, T − 1], the unique subgame
perfect equilibrium is that every miner includes an unrelated
transaction in ΓH (k, red), and miner i’s utility when doing so
is ui
(
σ¯,ΓH (k, red)
)
= λi
(
(T − k) f + f hb
)
.
11
Proof. Note that in ΓH (k, red) there are two actions available,
either include an unrelated transaction and receive f reward,
or include txha and receive f
h
a reward.
Consider any miner i. Denote by λku the accumulated block-
creation rates of miners, excluding miner i, that choose to
include an unrelated transaction in ΓH (k, red). Therefore, the
accumulated probabilities of miners that choose to include txha,
excluding miner i, is 1− λku − λi.
If miner i chooses to include an unrelated transaction
then either of the following occurs. First, with probability λi
miner i gets to create a block, includes an unrelated trans-
action and receives a reward of f . The subsequent subgame
is ΓH (k + 1, red). Alternatively, with probability λku another
miner that includes an unrelated transaction gets to create a
block, miner i gets no reward and the subsequent subgame
is ΓH (k + 1, red). Finally, with probability 1−λku−λi another
miner that includes txha gets to create a block, miner i gets no
reward and the subsequent subgame is ΓH (k + 1, irred).
Therefore, miner i’s utility when including an unrelated
transaction in these subgames is
ui
(
σ¯,ΓH (k, red)
)
=
λi ·
(
f + ui
(
σ¯,ΓH (k + 1, red)
))
+
λku · ui
(
σ¯,ΓH (k + 1, red)
)
+(
1− λi − λku
) · ui (σ¯,ΓH (k + 1, irred)) .
(1)
Similarly, if miner i chooses to include txha than either of
the following occurs. First, with probability λi miner i gets
to create a block, includes txha and receives a reward of tx
h
a.
The subsequent subgame is ΓH (k + 1, irred). Alternatively,
with probability λku another miner that includes an unrelated
transaction gets to create a block, miner i gets no reward
and the subsequent subgame is ΓH (k + 1, red). Finally, with
probability 1 − λku − λi another miner that includes txha gets
to create a block, miner i gets no reward and the subsequent
subgame is ΓH (k + 1, irred).
Therefore, miner i’s utility when including txha in these
subgames is
ui
(
σ¯,ΓH (k, red)
)
=
λi ·
(
f ha + ui
(
σ¯,ΓH (k + 1, irred)
))
+
λku · ui
(
σ¯,ΓH (k + 1, red)
)
+(
1− λi − λku
) · ui (σ¯,ΓH (k + 1, irred)) .
(2)
To prove the lemma we need to show that for any k ∈
[1, T − 1] the utility from including an unrelated transac-
tion (Eq. 1) exceeds that of including txha (Eq. 2). This reduces
to showing that
f + ui
(
σ¯,ΓH (k + 1, red)
)
>
f ha + ui
(
σ¯,ΓH (k + 1, irred)
)
,
(3)
which we do inductively.
a) Base: First, consider k = T − 1. Using Lemma VII.2
and Lemma VII.1 we get the condition presented in Eq. 3 is
f + λif
h
b > f
h
a + λif ,
or alternatively,
f hb >
f ha−f
λi
+ f . (4)
Since λmin ≤ λi and f hb > f
h
a−f
λmin
+ f , the condition
(Eq. 4) holds, meaning that in any subgame perfect equilibrium
miner i is strictly better by including an unrelated transaction
in subgame ΓH (T − 1, red).
Therefore, all miners choose to include unrelated transac-
tions in such subgames, meaning λju = 1−λi and 1−λi−λju =
0. Therefore, miner i’s utility (Eq. 1) is ui
(
σ¯,ΓH (k, red)
)
=
λi
(
f + f hb
)
.
b) Assumption: Consider any k ∈ [1, T − 2] and assume
that the claim holds for k + 1. That is, the unique subgame
perfect equilibrium in subsequent games ΓH (k + 1, red) is
for all miners to include an unrelated transaction, and the
utility of miner i when doing so is ui
(
σ¯,ΓH (k + 1, red)
)
=
λi
(
(T − k) + f hb
)
.
c) Step: Using the inductive assumption and
Lemma VII.1 the condition of Eq. 3 translates to
f + λi
(
(k + 1) f + f hb
)
> f ha + λi (k + 1) f ,
or alternatively,
f hb >
f ha−f
λi
+ f . (5)
Again, since λmin ≤ λi and f hb > f
h
a−f
λmin
+ f , the condition
(Eq. 5) holds, meaning that in the subgame perfect equilibrium
miner i’s strict best response is to include an unrelated
transaction in subgame ΓH (k, red).
Since all miners include unrelated transactions, we get λju =
1−λi and 1−λi−λju = 0. Therefore, miner i’s utility (Eq. 1)
is ui
(
σ¯,ΓH (k, red)
)
= λi
(
(T − k) f + f hb
)
.
We conclude with the main theorem regarding HTLC sus-
ceptibility to bribing attacks.
Theorem VII.4. Alice’s prescribed behavior of HTLC allows
Bob to bribe miners at a cost of f
h
a−f
λmin
+ f .
The proof follows directly from Lemmas VII.2 and VII.3,
which show that if Alice naively follows the prescribed
strategy then subgame perfect equilibrium of the initial sub-
game is for all miners to place unrelated transactions until
round T and then place Bob’s transaction.
Note that by Theorem VII.4, the bribing cost required
to attack HTLC is independent in T , meaning that simply
increasing the timeout does contribute to HTLC ’s security.
Of course once Alice sees an attack is taking place she can
respond by increasing her fee. We conclude by showing that
by paying a high fee dependent on vdep, Alice can prevent
the attack. We note that such a high fee is in violation of the
HTLC-Spec .
Corollary 2. Bob cannot bribe the miners in this manner if
Alice’s txha offers at least f
h
a > λmin
(
vdep − f)+ f .
Proof. In order to achieve the attack, Bob should make placing
unrelated transactions until T and placing his transaction at T
a subgame perfect equilibrium. As we have seen (Eq. 5), the
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threshold to incentivize the smallest miner is f hb >
f ha−f
λmin
+
f . Recall the fee f hb of the bribing transaction tx
h
b is upper
bounded by the HTLC tokens vdep. Therefore, to achieve the
attack it must hold that vdep > f
h
a−f
λmin
+ f . By choosing f ha >
λmin
(
vdep − f)+ f , Alice can prevent Bob from paying a fee
adhering to the bounds.
Myopic Miners: This bribery attack relies on all miners
being rational, hence considering their utility at game conclu-
sion instead of myopically optimizing for the next block. If
a portion of the miners are myopic and any of them gets to
create a block during the first T − 1 rounds, that miner would
include Alice’s transaction and Bob’s bribery attempt would
have failed.
In such scenarios the attack succeeds only with a certain
probability – only if a myopic miner does not create a block
in the first T − 1 rounds. The success probability therefore
decreases exponentially in T . Hence, to incentivize miners
to support the attack, Bob has to increase his offered bribe
exponentially in T .
We note a certain amount might be sufficient to bribe a
rational miner in some game suffixes but not in others.
The exact analysis relies on assumptions on the mining
power distribution, which is outside the scope of this work.
Notably, for the simpler case when all other miners are
myopic, miner i is incentivized to support the attack only
when it is her dominant strategy, matching the upper bound
of Winzer et al. [28].
D. Bribery-Accepting Rational-Miner Implementation
Aside from the RMI mechanism (§VI-B), we also imple-
mented a simpler Bitcoin Core patch supporting the mentioned
bribe attack on HTLC . This patch required 150 lines of C++
code and no additional external modules.
When the patched client receives transactions with an
unexpired timeout (waiting transactions) it stores them in a
data structure instead of discarding them. When creating a
new block, the client first checks if any of the timeouts have
elapsed, and if so, moves the relevant transactions to the
mempool.
When receiving conflicting transactions, instead of accept-
ing the first and discarding the second, it accepts the transac-
tion that offers a higher fee. In case of a conflict with a waiting
transaction, it chooses based on the condition described in
Theorem VII.4.
The simplicity of this patch demonstrates that miners can
trivially achieve non-myopic transaction selection optimiza-
tion.
E. Real-World Numbers
We conclude this section by presenting three examples of
HTLC being used in running systems, and show the substantial
costs to make them resistant against bribery attacks.
Table V presents for each example the HTLC tokens vdep,
the base fee f , and the ratio of required tokens for bribery
resistance (Theorem VII.4) and the base fee
λmin(vdep−f)+f
f .
Name vdep f
λmin
(
vdep − f)+ f
f
Lightning channel
(BTC) [99], [100] 2.684 2.22e-6 1.21e4
Litecoin atomic swap
(LTC) [101] 1.337 3.14e-4 435.7
Contingent ZK roof
(BTC) [16], [102],
[103]
0.1 0.002 10.5
Table V: HTLC bribe resistance cost examples.
To estimate the base fee we conservatively take the actual
paid fee, which is an upper bound. We conservatively estim-
ate λmin = 0.01 [76]; miners with lower mining power are less
likely due to economy-of-scale [98].
The first use-case is of a Bitcoin Lightning channel [99],
[100], where the required fee to secure the contract against a
bribery is 1.21e4 times what was actually paid. The second
use-case is of a Litecoin atomic swap [101], requiring 436
times higher fee to be secured against bribes. The third use-
case is of a contingent ZK proof demo [16], [102], [103],
requiring 10.5 times higher fee to be secured. We note the
latter relatively-low ratio is due to the low vdep.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We introduce a novel approach of utilizing miner’s ration-
ality to secure smart contracts, and use it to design MAD-
HTLC , a contract implementing HTLC-Spec . We show with
game-theoretic analysis that MAD-HTLC is secure, unlike the
prevalent HTLC, which is vulnerable to cheap bribery attacks
when miners behave rationally – we qualitatively tighten the
known bound. We demonstrate the efficacy of our approach
by implementing and executing MAD-HTLC on Bitcoin. We
also demonstrate the practicality of implementing a rational
miner by patching the standard Bitcoin client.
Both the attack against HTLC and the secure alternative
MAD-HTLC have direct impact on a variety of contracts using
the HTLC-Spec design pattern. As miners’ incentives to act
rationally increase, those systems will become vulnerable and
can directly adopt MAD-HTLC as a plug-in alternative.
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APPENDIX A
BITCOIN IMPLEMENTATION
Fig. 3 shows the Bitcoin Script implementation of MH-Dep ,
MH-Col and HTLC . It also presents the required input data
for each redeem path.
Script is stack-based, and to evaluate input data and a
contract the latter is concatenated to the former, and then
executed: constants are pushed into the stack, instructions
operate on the stack. For a successful evaluation the stack must
hold exactly one element with value 1 after all operations are
executed.
a) MH-Dep: The script expects either two or three data
elements. It hashes the first two and checks if they match imga
and imgb.
If the first matches imga but the second does not match imgb
(redeem path 1), then the script verifies the existence of a third
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1 siga OP_0 preimga
2 sigb preimgb OP_0
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1 sigb OP_0
2 preimgb preimga
Redeem path Input data
1 siga preimga
2 sigb OP_0
Figure 3: MH-Dep , MH-Col and HTLC Script implementation.
data element, and that it is a signature created with Alice’s
secret key.
If the first does not match imga but the second matches imgb
(redeem path 2), then the script verifies the existence of a third
data element, and that it is a signature created with Bob’s
secret key. It also verifies the timeout has elapsed.
If both the first and the second data elements match imga
and imgb (redeem path 3), respectively, then the script expects
no third data element and evaluates successfully.
b) MH-Col: The script expects exactly two data ele-
ments. It begins by verifying timeout has elapsed, and then
hashes the first element and checks if it matches imga.
If not (redeem path 1), the script then verifies the second
data is a signature created with Bob’s secret key. Otherwise
(redeem path 2), the script hashes the second data element and
verifies it matches imgb.
c) MH-Col: The script expects exactly two data ele-
ments. It hashes the first element and checks if it
matches imga.
If it does (redeem path 1), the script then verifies the second
data is a signature created with Alice’s secret key. Otherwise
(redeem path 2), the script hashes verifies the timeout has
elapsed, and that the second data element is a signature created
with Bob’s secret key.
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